Showing posts with label flood hazard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label flood hazard. Show all posts

BC Earthquake and Flood Hazard Zones - Natural Hazard Locations Key To Risk Management

BC Earthquake
BC Earthquake Risk Map
BC Earthquake
BC Earthquake December 2015 in High
Shake Hazard Zone
Location , location , location.

Was the December 30, 2015 earthquake in BC unexpected? No. It occurred in a high shake hazard zone as shown in the image to the left. Certainly risks can be managed when hazards are better known and policies are put in place to manage them.

Flood risks are like earthquake risks, as they are based on location.  For river flooding, floodplain maps show hazards due to high river flood levels.  This post shows the hazard zones maps available in BC.

Urban overland flood hazards can be predicted as well, beyond
regulated valley limits with river flood plain hazard zones.
We cannot predict where the next major storm will occur but the physical characteristics of the your location will put you in a hazard zone when and if that storm comes.

Calgary flooding was in a river flood hazard zone, known to be high risk, but ignored in terms of land use planning and flood plain regulation. Other urban flooding hazard locations have been thought to be difficult to map and manage, but research by CityFloodMap.Com shows those locations, beyond tranditional river valley flood plains, can be mapped as well - see image to right and our previous post on the details of analysis of Toronto flood events. Urban overland flood paths are like earthquake fault lines - you can't see them most of the time as they are usually inactive. And they both have wide areas of influence beside them - for overland flood paths this influence is because properties in the flow path are connected to many others by an underground sewer network - for fault lines the earth is connected.

Sometimes media get confused about location and assign risk from one area to another by mistake. In Toronto, when the GO Train was stranded in the Don River flood plain, the media, the train operator and the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario explained it as an unprecedented weather event, some linking it to climate change. How wrong.

Natural hazard reporting needs better
science in reporting causes.
In fact the record rainfall on July 8, 2013 that stranded the GO Transit commuter train was in Mississauga, in the Etobicoke Creek Watershed, several watersheds away from the Don River`s watershed. Rainfall in the East York area on the Don River Watershed recorded only 51 mm of rainfall according to the closest Environment Canada gauge - much less than the record 126 mm of rainfall in Mississauga`s Pearson International Airport.  The rail line was also in a high risk flood zone, not unlike "High River" Alberta was (and is).

More details on GO Train flooding are in a previous post. The following illustration shows how basic physical facts, including location, are ignored when reporting on the location of natural hazards and incidents:
BC Earthquake
Reporting on natural hazards should focus on basic facts, unlike the Toronto GO Train flood reporting that linked the stranded commuter train to record rainfall in a different watershed beyond the flooded Don River flood plain.
Location, location, location is important for assessing natural hazards and interpreting extreme rainfall.
Often media reports will not identify the spatial variability extreme rainfall, and may only have access to information available through Environment Canada which has a few active rain gauges (climate stations) that record short duration rainfall intensities.  The image above shows scattered Environment Canada stations. Below, more detailed City of Toronto data is explored.

Toronto Water, the group responsible for Environmental Assessment Studies that investigate flood causes and recommend solutions, summarized rainfall patterns for a Ward 11 community meeting on July 19, 2013 shortly after the July storm - recorded rainfall data is available from locations than Environment Canada sites. The presentation to the community showed very little to moderate rain recorded in the eastern part of Toronto, and few reported basement floods. The Don Watershed limits have been added to the a community meeting slide to show that only moderate rainfall was observed overall in the Don River Watershed.

Moderate rainfall in the Don River Watershed corresponds to an overall 5-10 year return period design event, with some Toronto gauges recording less than 2 year return period rainfall (19 mm) in the eastern part of the Don River Watershed, and some gauges on the western edge recording higher total.

As a result of the variable rainfall pattern The Toronto Observer reported that according to the Insurance Bureau of Canada, the Scarborough community was 'unscathed' by the July 8, 2013 event. This is supported by comments provided by Toronto Water in the report:

July 8, 2013 Storm Variability Toronto
Toronto Water received over 4,700 calls regarding basement flooding, but only 50 came in from Scarborough, said Ted Bowering, director of water infrastructure management for Toronto Water.

In Scarborough in fact the storm wasn’t all that intense. It was kind of like a normal summer thunderstorm,” he said. “So the impact was not that great at all.”

Flood reports vary after July 8, 2013 storm in Toronto. Less than 2% of
reported floods were from East Toronto (Scarborough). 
A City of Toronto staff report provides a less cluttered summary map of the rainfall variability and a summary table of reported flooding. The table shows less than 2% of reported flooding was in eastern Toronto, demonstrating the variability in rainfall severity.

Location can be miscommunicated even by the best managers. For example the TRCA summarized extreme rainfall events in Ontario and implied Mississauga rainfall was in Toronto and did not distinguish between watersheds where rainfall occurs and where it causes flooding:
Go Train flood toronto
Mississauga's CN Tower? Location matters in hydrology. Extreme rainfall is not evenly distributed and can be high in one watershed and low in another. This was the case for Hurricane Hazel and also the July 8, 2013 storm - both storm were light on east Toronto (including the Don River Watershed) and heavy in the western watersheds including those outside of Toronto.
Note: August 19, 2005 storm appears mislabeled as '2013'.
****

So location matters for natural hazard risks. Extreme rainfall is highly variable in terms of its spatial pattern. Sometimes local data, beyond that which is available from Environment Canada, can be used to assess the variability in rainfall across watersheds and drainage catchments,

****

To help assess flood risks, CityFloodMap.Com has created Canada-wide mapping of extreme rainfall trends so that risks of flooding due to higher rainfall can be assessed for 565 climate stations locations. Fortunately, this Environment Canada data shows that only a few percentage of the stations have a statistically significant increase in observed extreme rainfall. CityFloodMap.Com has also created tablular summaries of extreme rainfall trends, summarized by province.

Toronto GO Train Flood Avoidable July 8, 2013 - Worse May 29, 2013 Flood Ignored



Could the stranded GO Train in Toronto's Don River valley have been avoided on July 8, 2013? Could use of known flood risk mapping and real-time flood level monitors avoided the near catastrophe? Yes. And yes and yes. In fact, on May 29, 2013 flooding was deeper but the peak at 5 a.m. missed the trains!

It is likely that if there had been fatalities among the 1400 GO Train passengers, Metrolinx employees or Toronto's first responders, the Ontario government would have called an inquiry (see clipping at right). The Ministry of Labour, who recognizes the occupational health and safety hazards of flooding,  would likely have found that Metrolinx failed to identify known workplace hazards or identify safe work practices for its employees.

And that provincial inquiry would have revealed that:

GO Train Stranded Flood Toronto
Mock Go Train Drowning Inquiry newspaper clipping.  This near miss could
have been fatal to passengers, Metrolinx workers, or first responders.
i) flood risk of the rail line was known to be frequent from available flood hazard maps and reports (best and most frequently updated hydrologic modelling of flows and hydraulic modelling of flood levels in Canada actually),

ii) July 8, 2013 observed flow rates and flood levels were not rare or unexpected from a flood risk management perspective - i.e., could have been anticipated - in fact, on May 29, 2013, just 40 days and forty nights before the incident, flood levels peaked 20 cm higher,

iii) monitoring real-time flood levels were rising rapidly upstream of and beside the flood site could have guided train dispatchers to not send the 5:30 train (GO Transit 835) into the flooded Don River valley,

iv) train frequency increase (more than rain frequency) contributed to the near tragedy, and increased risk exposure as the number of Richmond Hill trains on this line doubled since 1996,

v) any tragedy that occurred was avoidable.

Inquiries get to the bottom of risk issues following deaths. For example, the Walkerton Commission of Inquiry has resulted in a comprehensive risk management strategy for managing drinking water risks in Ontario. But this was only after Walkerton’s drinking water system was contaminated with deadly bacteria, seven people died, and more than 2,300 became ill. The goal of the Inquiry was to answer questions:
GO train Flood
GO Train Flood July 8, 2013 - Toronto Don River Valley
  • What actually happened?
  • What were the causes?
  • Who was responsible?
  • How could this have been prevented?
  • How do we make sure this never happens again?
Let's look at the same questions in the context of the Metrolinx Richmond Hill train flood incident in 2013.

What Actually Happened?

The GTA Don River Watershed (correction to original post Jan.2, 2016) received up to 126 mm of rainfall on July 8, 2013.  That is a lot of rain and runoff was high, resulting in flood warnings and high flood levels at the Don River flood monitoring stations.

River levels at the upstream East Don River flood level monitoring site (TRCA's East Don at York Mills HY022 gauge) were already rising when the previous by "5:00 pm" train level Union Station. Upstream flood levels were even higher when the stranded "5:30" train, Go Transit 835, left Union Station - this warning sign was not used by Metrolinx to assess the risk to their route further downstream.  Graphs are generated from TRCA's online archive.

Go Train Flood Toronto
Recorded East Don River at York Mills Flood Levels July 8, 2013 (per TRCA)
5:30 Richmond Hill GO Train departed Union Station after upstream flood levels has already risen rapidly.

Why did the 5:30 train leave when the upstream flood levels pointed to potential risks?
What Were the Causes?
Metrolinx GO Train frequency has doubled from 3 to 6 return
trains per day from Union Station to Richmond Hill since 1996.

Cause 1). Train frequency has doubled over the past 19 years, increasing exposure to flood events.

The Richmond Hill GO Train service started in 1978 and frequency has increased.  In 1996, service was cut to 3 trains per day while currently there are 6 trains during the afternoon / evening period (a 100% increase in risk exposure).

GO Train flood Toronto
Train operation was halted or detoured during previous Don River floods
as documented in the 1981 Flood Inquiry Report.
Cause 2). The track floods frequently due to summer storm events (or spring melt).

The Keating Channel Flood Inquiry Report for Premier Davis in 1981 documented frequent flooding decades earlier, even when urbanization of the Don River Watershed was not as intense as it is now.

Cause 3). Water levels rose to expected design flood levels on July 8, 2013, but measurements were ignored / not considered.

The key concern here is that design flood levels experienced on July 8, 2013 were not rare (see footnote 1 on correlation of storm vs. flood severity).  The 2-year return period flood level is 79.45 metres near the Evergreen Brick Works, across from the flooded GO Train site. In common terms, this flood level can be expected every 2 years, and so over a long period, it has a very high risk of occurring (about 17 times between the start of service in 1978 and the flood of 2013).

Higher safety-risk flood levels of one metre higher are not rare from a flood risk management perspective.  Even a higher 10-year flood level (80.41 metres) has a 88% risk of happening at least once over 20 years. This is illustrated on the graph below which compares expected design flood levels, risk of reaching these levels over time, and actual real-time flood levels recorded July 8, 2013. These design flood levels are from a Evergreen Brick Works presentation and, a site located beside the stranded train location - the Brick Works has a comprehensive flood risk management strategy.
GO Train Flood Toronto
Recorded Don River Flood Levels at Todmorden July 8, 2013 (per TRCA).
Design Flood Levels per MMM (2008) per Evergreen’s Urban Watershed Forum 2015.
Flood risks were known. Upstream flood levels had risen. Local flood levels were rising.














So, the causes include more frequent trains travelling through a highly flood prone part of the Don River valley, and the operator Metrolinx having ignored measured flood levels.

Surprisingly - even higher flood levels were recorded on May 29, 2013 but trains missed this peak due to timing. The May 28, 2013 Union Station departures occurred before the rise in flood levels and the May 29, 2013 Richmond Hill trains arrived near Todmorden after the peak flood levels has subsided (GO Transit may have modified schedule). The maximum track flooding on May 29, 2013 appears to be 20 cm deeper than on July 8, 2013 - rainfall in East York was over 40% greater.
Worst GO Train Flood Toronto
May 29, 2013 flooding is deeper than July 8, 2013 flooding based on TRCA Todmorden Flood Monitoring Gauge.
The May 29, 2013 flood would have flooded tracks by almost 2 metres.
GO Trains appear to have missed peak flood depths by departing before and after peak flood level occurred.

Worst Metrolinx Flood
May 29, 2013 flood flow rates at the incident site higher than July 8, 2013 flood flows by 10 cubic metres per second.
TRCA from Todmorden Flood Monitoring Gauge
GO Train Flood
May 29, 2013 Flood Levels Worse Than July 8, 2013
But even May 29, 2013 flood levels were not unprecedented according to Toronto Police.  That flood closed the Don Valley Parkway, left it covered in mud and according to reports by City News:

“I haven’t seen flooding on the Don Valley Parkway like this,” Toronto police Staff. Sgt. Brian Bowman told Breakfast Television. “One of my officers had, back in 1986. He saw it reach the top of the [concrete] jersey barriers, so it’s not unprecedented.”

Not only were flood levels July 8, 2013 not rare, flows were below common design flow rates (see footnote).

Who Is Responsible?

In Ontario, everyone is responsible for safety in the workplace. Employers and employees have a role. Reports suggest that Metrolinx, the employer, did not receive TRCA flood warnings and did not make use of monitored flood levels in the watershed to inform its operations. Perhaps it did not understand the workplace hazards on the Richmond Hill line.

GO Train Flood Safety
Ontario Ministry of Labour identifies drowning and other risks associated
with flooding.
After the incident, Metrolinx dismissed the value of TRCA flood warnings saying to the National Post “Because the TRCA flood warning was fairly general, it only has limited value,” said Greg Percy, the Metrolinx vice president of infrastructure. It is understandable that weather warnings do not always translate into actual flood conditions.  But Metrolinx did not acknowledge the use or value of measured flood levels, including those upstream on the East Don tributary and those adjacent to the flood-prone tracks at the nearby Todmorden flood monitoring gauge.

Evergreen Brick Works beside the stranded GO Train site has a flood
emergency plan and its building are flood proofed. Brick Works reported
higher flooding in May 2013 than July 2013 on their site.
It would appear Metrolinx was responsible for not assessing workplace hazards for its employees and customers.  Also, it did not develop safe work practices and procedure that would allow it to identify flood risks and take appropriate action (cancel service, substitute buses instead of trains, divert to Barrie line, etc.). Employers like Evergreen Brickworks have had flood emergency planning in place for many years as the location is known to be highly flood prone.

TheStar.Com reported two days after the July 8, 2013 incident that stranded customers were offered $100 as compensation and Mary Proc, GO vice-president for customer service said "It is an exceptional gesture for an unprecedented circumstance." She did not acknowledge that while the inconvenience to passengers was unprecedented, the flood levels were not. She added “That was a night of firsts for us: The first time we had a month of rain in one night; the first time that any customer had to wait seven hours to be moved off a train, and the first time we deployed boats to take our customers off a train.” She did not acknowledge that more rain, more runoff volume, higher flow rates and higher flood depths occurred on May 29, 2013, or that a month of rain in one night is not an uncommon design event for prudent flood risk management. GO Transit (@GOTransit) did Tweet about Richmond Hill line disruptions at 3 a.m. on May 29, 2013 suggesting perhaps they are aware of flood conditions on the line before scheduled morning trains:



How Could This Have Been Prevented?

The East Don flood level graph above showed that the Don River had risen quickly by 5:30 p.m.. The graph below shows that flood levels where the train was stranded had risen nearly half way between the normal water level and the track level by 5:30 p.m..  By the time the stranded GO Train approached the Brickworks at 5:45 p.m., the real time level monitoring would have shown the Don River flood levels approaching the track - see graph below.  But these levels were not used by Metrolinx.

Go Train Flood
Track level is below the frequent flood zone (2-year flood). The 5:30 p.m. Richmond Hill GO Train departed when upstream and local flood levels were rising. The GO Train was stranded at 5:45 p.m. when flood levels were at frequent flood levels - not even up to the 2-year flood level of 79.45 m.

This accident could have been prevented by having operational procedures included checking monitored flood levels and modifying service to avoid sending trains onto flooded tracks.

How Do We Make Sure This Never Happens Again?

GO Train Flood
Environmental Commissioner mistakenly links GO Train flooding to
climate change, ignoring known risk factors, watershed conditions,
and operational gaps contributing to flood risk and damages.
According to the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, the commuter train flooding is a symptom of climate change (Feeling the Heat: Greenhouse Gas Progress Report 2015 Media Release).

Obviously that is not an informed statement. By linking the GO Train incident to climate change and suggesting that risk mitigation efforts relate to emissions controls, the fundamental causes, responsibilities, and potential solutions to the near tragedy have all been grossly ignored.

To ensure this never happens again Metrolinx has had to suffer through 'near miss' in occupational safety terminology. Putting on a positive spin at their September 10, 2013 customer service update, Metrolinx suggested they received as many commendations as complaints (perhaps the commendations were directed to first responders?).  Metrolink also highlighted the 126 mm of rainfall in the "Toronto area", failing to note that record was at Pearson Airport in the Etobicoke Creek watershed, not the Don River watershed where GO Transit 835 was stranded. Also Metrolinx would look at several areas of concern including:

  • "identifying high risk areas,
  • improving customer messaging systems, and
  • upgrading the early warning storm warnings."


GO Train Flood Toronto Metrolinx
Metrolinx Customer Service Report September 2013 refers to 'massive' and 'record' storm as causes to the serious incident.

Metrolinx could identify high risk areas by reading the Flood Inquiry report from 1981 (a real Inquiry for Premier Davis ... not the mock one at the start of this post).  It identifies railway line damage and flooding during ice-free conditions (i.e., no ice blockage of bridges) during the "Great Flood" on September 13, 1878, the spring of 1914, and during two storms in 1980 (March and April). Limited flooding was also reported on May 11, 1981 including the area of the Bayview Extension and the Toronto Brick Yards (the stranded GO Train location near the Evergreen Brick Works).  The report indicates that train operation has halted, or trains were detoured during floods, including December 25, 1979, January 11, 1980, March 21, 1980, April 14, 1980, February 11, 1981 and May 11, 1981.

go train flood
Example historical flooding in vicinity of stranded GO Train during July 8, 2013 flood (1981 Inquiry report Table 1).
According to the 1981 Flood Inquiry report, during the March 21, 1980 flood "Part of the CNR track flooded to the north and east of a point south of Bloor Street."  The 20 hour low intensity spring storm produced high runoff as ground in the watershed was partly saturated and frozen.  This area north of Bloor Street corresponds to the location of the July 8, 2013 Go Train flood.  During the April 14, 1980 flood, after a 5-6 hour period of rain, CNR tracks at the Bloor Street ramp were flooded. The GO Train was stranded just east of where the Bloor Street ramp connects to the Bayview Ave.

GO Train Flood Passenger Swimming
GO Train / GO Transit 835 passenger swimming from
stranded train in Don River valley.
The following summer on June 26, 2014 InsideToronto.Com reported "Metrolinx is crediting recent improvements to its flood monitoring protocol in lessening the impacts to morning GO Transit commuters following a severe rainstorm." Metrolix reported that "Three GO trains en route to Union Station were also diverted from the Richmond Hill to the Barrie rail corridor to avoid the flooded tracks.".  This was after a moderate storm described as an "event which dropped some 50 millimetres of rain in the Don Valley alone, according to Environment Canada.". A 50 millimetre rainfall event is less severe than a common 5 year / 12 hour event, or  10 year / 6 hour event, meaning the track did, does and will flood frequently.


GO Train Flood
It is unlikely that Metrolinx would admit that the July 8, 2013 flood was a common design condition for flood risk management, and that it was perhaps just lucky in its complacency / ignorance - May 29, 2013 flooding less than 6 weeks earlier was worse. Fortunately complacency is no longer the case and it is rerouting trains after even moderate design storms such as on July 26, 2014, June 22/23, 2015, October 28, 2015.......

A post below to the blog www.thiscrazytrain.com has a comment from an apparent operator indicating that the flooding of the tracks was indeed frequent and that the operating procedures have now changed.

Anonymous said...

Back when I started as long as we could still see the rails we used to drive through that like it was nothing. Now the second the water starts touching the rails an automatic system declares an 'emergency' and the whole line is shut down. Not saying that's the right or wrong way, but its interesting how times have changed.






*******
Footnotes:
1 - Correlations of Storm Severity vs. Flood Level Severity.  How could a record amount of rain have been recorded on July 8, 2013 but not a rare design flood level in the Don River flood plain?  The answer is that record amounts of rain did not occur everywhere across the Don River watershed - conservatism in flood risk management and planning assumes extreme rainfall occurs over the entire watershed. The record rain occurred over one small part of the watershed, such that the resulting flow rates were not extreme, having less than 10 year return periods. So while the record rainfall had a 100 year return period somewhere beyond the Don River watershed (Pearson Airport in the Etobicoke Creek watershed), on average, overall, July 8, 2013 was less severe over the large Don River watershed. The video at the very bottom of the post shows the July 8, 2013 storm pattern from historical radar over the approximate Don River watershed area.

GO Train Worst Flood
Worse Flooding May 29, 2013
The May 29, 2013 flood resulted in a higher flood level at the Todmorden monitoring station.  As reported by the Globe and Mail, less than half the July 8, 2013 rainfall fell on Toronto that day "In all, Toronto and the area north received up to 60 millimetres of rain before the downpour eased at around 6 a.m. No injuries or serious traffic accidents were reported." Our correction to that report is that at the Toronto East York Dustan climate station (ID 6158751) a higher 73.6 millimetres of rainfall was recorded (late on May 28, 2013 before the flood levels and flows crested the next day).

Half the rainfall and worse flooding? Yes. Welcome to the world of hydrology where the anecedent soil moisture conditions, and the temporal and spatial patterns of storms over watersheds affect the cumulative runoff volume which can influence the peak flow and peak water levels as much as any local 'spot' measurement of rainfall.

Toronto North York July 8, 2013
Rainfall Just Half Mississauga
Record Rainfall
On July 8, 2013, the rainfall across the Don River watershed was variable with much lower totals in the mid portion of the watershed. The Environment Canada historical climate archives show that the Toronto North York climate station (ID 615S001) measured only 65.8 mm of rain on July 8, 2013, just over half the Pearson record; the Toronto East York Dustan climate station (ID 6158751) measured only 51.4 mm of rain, less than half the Pearson total. Summary tables are shown below and at right (click to enlarge).

Despite this fact of lower, non-record Toronto-proper rainfall, the CBC reported the July 8, 2013 GO Train incident as a top weather story of 2013 saying:

"When you look at the amounts of rain that fell ... it was like Toronto was the bull's eye," said Phillips, who described it as "a direct hit with a drenching rain storm."

Toronto East York July 8, 2013
Rainfall Just Half Mississauga
Record Rainfall
The CBC News has mistaking described record rainfall in Mississauga (Pearson climate station location) and in the Etobicoke Creek watershed with moderate rainfall in Toronto in the Don River watershed (where the GO Train was stranded).  A watershed map is provided below.

The May 28-29, 2013 storm that caused higher flows and higher flooding on the GO Train tracks dropped 43% more rain than July 8, 2013 in the mid portion of the watershed according to the Toronto East York Dustan climate station records.

The CBC News story also fails to recognize the frequent flood-prone nature of the rail tracks where the GO Train was stranded. Such reporting is an example of "anchoring or focalism", the cognitive bias per Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics winner Daniel Kahneman, in which people rely too heavily on the first piece of information present (Pearson/Mississauga rainfall record) when it is in fact irrelevant to Toronto/Don Watershed flooding.

Here is a summary of mid watershed rainfall (East York), and flows and water levels (Todmorden monitoring site near the stranded GO Train site) for the May 2013 and July 2013 floods:

Date                      East York Rainfall      Peak Flow     Peak Flood Level
May 28-29, 2013           73.4 mm               190+ cms              80.9 m
July 8-9, 2013                51.4 mm               180+ cms              80.7 m

From a design storm perspective the recorded flow rates on May 29 and July 8 were low to moderate. The chart below from TRCA's Don River hydrology report shows a range of design flows from drought conditions, to average yearly peaks, up to rare storms considered for flood hazard management and design in Ontario. At less than 200 cms, both the 2013 peak flood flows were less extreme than the one-in-five-year design flow, a frequent design flow that has a 20% (1/5) chance each year of being exceeded.



RSA Fresh Water Flood Coverage Acknowledges "Concurrent Causation" in Flood Damage Claims

An article in candianunderwriters.ca describes the new RSA fresh water endorsement expected to be available to the large majority of RSA customers.  It is encouraging to see the recognition that there has been 'concurrent causation' for flood damages:

"Some of the challenge we had with the floods in Alberta and in Toronto was this concurrent causation issue, where you had sewer backup happening at the same time as you had clean water flood coming in and you can't really say 'Part of it is brown water, part of it is clear water,'" the RSA representative said.

This represents progress in terms of characterizing the complexity of flood risks, but what is missing from the discussion (for Toronto table land type flooding as opposed to Alberta riverine flooding) is that:

Extraneous clear flow from groundwater infiltration
and inflow points enters the 'brown' sanitary sewer.
Comment 1) Sewer backup water during severe storms is often brown and clear together, because during extreme storms, the extraneous inflows to the sanitary sewer system dilute the typical brown water, typically by a factor of 10 to 1.  For infrastructure managers, the clear water components is often called RDII, or rainfall dependent inflow and infiltration - this clean water component can peak at up to 5 L/s/ha in a partially separated sewer system during an extreme event. Because of this, separating clear water and brown water risks is always difficult to do in practice.

Clear water surface flooding enters doors and windows and
exits low lying  upstream properties via floor drain.
Comment 2) The clear and brown water coming in typically occurs at different locations in the neighbourhood's drainage system.  Low-lying areas with low exposed openings can allow clear water to enter buildings and then exits via floor drains.  Those extraneous flows enter the sanitary sewer system and cause brown+clear water to enter downstream properties via floor drains.  Because of this, a downstream property may be vulnerable to brown water backup, because of an upstream property's clear water risk.

RSA indicated that regarding the old sewer backup coverage:

Downstream sanitary sewer overwhelmed with brown and
clear water creates backup, entering property via floor drain.
"In the past, that endorsement was much broader and in some respects would cover flood not intentionally but did cover flood."

Comment 3) What this means is that for some insurers, the backup premiums may have been increasing to pay for clear water, overland flood damages.  In my case, for example with a different insurer, the premium has increased 800% and the coverage limit has decreased for backup insurance - this could be explained by unintentional coverage of clear water, overland flooding in my city / neighbourhood. In an ideal world, RSA could decrease backup premiums by limiting coverage of uninsured perils like clear water, overland flooding, while pricing clear water flooding separately. .
Because of Comment 1 and 2, it will difficult to separate the different risk coverage

Just like cable TV, you can now pick and pay for your flood peril coverage:

"If you get Waterproof you get sewer backup and the flood, but if you don't want the Waterproof endorsement, if you don't want the flood, you can just buy limited sewer backup," RSA adds, saying that they are "putting a lot of emphasis" on training brokers.

Comment 4) This approach may meet RSA goals of limiting coverage for uninsured perils and increasing premiums for flood to help cover increasing costs during extreme events.  In the end, the bottom line for the business is not dependent on having an optimal, precise vulnerability assessment for individual properties - all it needs is a sub-optimal net positive outcome on the portfolio.  RSA is making an incremental adjustment toward a more sustainable, better priced risk model with the changes.

Not all properties are eligible for flood coverage though:

RSA noted  that for high risk properties, it would be difficult to cover fresh water flooding "because there is almost a guarantee that something is going to happen," she added.

Comment 5) High risk properties can include those in a defined river floodplains.  It is reasonable approach that coverage is not available and instead land use policies should deter such high risk developments over time.  What is missing in this approach is that governments and their agencies (Conservation Authorities in Ontario) and insurance companies are not managing all risks in a complete and comprehensive way.  Will RSA risk zones be shared with municipalities, or with property owners to support land use planning policies or flood proofing efforts by individuals or businesses? Not likely. Or will the sole purpose of the risk maps be to make decisions on the portfolio for the benefit of shareholders - that is likely - there is nothing wrong with that, but if so, let's take a step back and consider what the insurance industry's role really is in terms of managing society's flood risks.  Are the efforts by RSA to define flood risk a benefit to society or the balance sheet? Does it make sense that individual insurers redo overland flood risk assessments independently from each other, or should a public flood underwriter make those assessments to be shared by the insurance industry and municipalities?  In that manner, there would be no gaps in coverage and risk mitigation strategy.

Comment 6) What is needed to enhance the RSA sub-optimal, incremental improvement to risk pricing for flooding during extreme storms? The answer is a more robust, neighbourhood scale vulnerability model and a comprehensive approach to riverine flood risk.  This could result in and mandatory coverage for highest risk overland flood properties as one outcome.  Similarly, premiums for backup coverage could be increased in neighbourhoods with high overland flood risk, because clear water entering a few properties and overwhelm the sanitary sewer system in a widespread area. Our research shows how overland flood and backup (basement) flood risks are correlated in this post. Because risks are at a neighbourhood scale and policies are written at a property scale there is no way that the current insurance model can be optimal.

RSA notes in the article that "Canada doesn't have a lot of high risk zones with respect to flood."

Comment 7) In making this statement RSA should have distinguished between urban overland flash flooding and riverine flooding in a valley systems.  Certainly a low percentage of properties are within vulnerable valley flood plain areas where rivers and creeks can swell.  But on table land, urban flash flooding affects many neighbourhoods built before improved 1980's drainage standard improvements. These table land areas are where 'concurrent causation' really occurs.

Lastly RSA notes "That is going to be very clearly defined as what's covered and not covered"

Comment 8) Costs and revenue may be in a more sustainable balance with the RSA policy updates, but this may not necessarily be because policy coverage is more 'clear' in the future. As noted in the initial comments, there will generally always be some 'brown' mixed into the system when it comes to extreme storms.

Overland Flood Factors Affect Basement Flood Incidents - Correlating Insurance Perils and Mapping Risk

overland flood Toronto
Overland flow risk mapping and basement
flood history highlights risks on table land,
outside river flood plains and traditional hazard
mapping areas.
Flood is the new fire.

Blue is the new red ink, as water damage claims increase. Enough slogans though ... time for insights resulting from new overland risk mapping for the GTA!

Overland flooding had recently becoming an insured peril for residential property owners, offered by Aviva Canada.  Others are following suit.  So now is the perfect time to explore the differences in "surface flooding" types in an urban environment, to assess risk factors and even look for correlations with traditional insured perils, like sewer back-ups that cause basement flooding.  Understanding risk factors can support better decisions and help direct mitigation efforts.

First some set-up and definitions.

Media often reports the devastating flooding in Alberta and Toronto in 2013 in the same breath, but there are important distinctions to be made - High River's "riverine flooding" along the low-lying bottom of a defined valley or wide flood plain is quite different than "urban flooding" high up on the table land (i.e., many thousands of Toronto's flooded homes).  To put things in perspective, the Toronto's Don River has a drainage area of 360 sq.km contributing to valley flow, while a table land area subject to urban flooding may have as little as a 0.01 sq.km, or 10 hectare drainage area.

Riverine flooding is largely manageable - spatially fixed, quantifiable in terms of flow frequency and flood depth, and (in Ontario) regulated through the provincial policy statement on natural hazards, MNR guidelines, and conservation authority regulations.  In the past, flood plain mapping to define riverine flood risks was once the 'bread and butter' of engineering consultants, who started number-crunching U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's HEC-2 simulation models back using punch cards - yes, that long ago.  The limitation is that only a few percent of Ontarians live in flood plains according to Conservation Ontario.  And based on new analysis from cityfloodmap.com, only about 2% of May 12, 2000, August 19, 2005, and July 8, 2013 Toronto flooding occurred in river flood vulnerable areas!

Urban flooding, in contrast, affects a greater proportion of the population - 86% of Ontarians live in urban areas per the 2011 census - but this type of flooding is not as readily managed.  In fact, risk factors equivalent to flood plain maps are seldom ever mapped.  This is because urban flooding is transient and overland flow paths are not permanent physical features that are part of i) a defined valley, or ii) municipal drainage infrastructure.  Overland flow paths appear for a few minutes or hours every few decades and then subside.  So calling this 'flash flooding' is appropriate - engineering studies show severe urban flooding events are most highly correlated with high short-term rainfall intensities over minutes.  Hours later, the overland flow is gone.

To prevent urban flooding, engineers have been designing the overland drainage network though subdivision grading since the early 1980's when "dual drainage design" emerged in Ontario.  This approach recognized the limited capacity of the minor system (underground sewer system) for conveniently conveying small storm runoff, and the need to design the major system (above-ground overland system) for extreme storms.  In pre-1980 development, the major system still exists but it can run haphazardly beyond roads, through back yards, between houses and into basement windows and walkouts. And this critical, non-designed, transient overland flood risk has not ever been mapped - ta da! - until now.

New analysis from cityfloodmap.com in the slides below ties overland flood risks all together, reviewing flood incidents across regulated valley hazard areas and river flood vulnerable areas (riverine flooding), and within overland flow risk areas across Toronto table lands (urban flooding).  It provides insight into risk factors affecting overland flooding and direction on de-risk opportunities.  Most importantly, it demonstrates the correlation between traditional sewer back-up peril and the emerging overland peril, which should cause some insurance providers to evaluate portfolio risk (where should coverage be coupled or excluded in isolation, recognizing the correlations).



If flood is the new fire for the insurance industry, this new analysis, which demonstrates neighbourhood scale flood risk factors due to overland and catchment slope risks, should also prompt discussion on how flood risks are assessed, priced and prioritized for mitigation, adaptation and insurance purposes. Just as fire underwriters identify neighbourhood scale risk factors and consider fire suppression capabilities of municipalities, flood risk assessors should consider the overland risk factors, that extend well beyond the extent of individual properties. Determining risks should not only consider whether an individual property has a reverse slope driveway when broader overland flood risk factors can be readily quantified.


Drought to Deluge - Toward Holistic Flood Risk Management

An online article in Canadian Underwriters describes the new flood risk models developed to assess hazards, price flood endorsements and assess portfolio risk in canadianunderwriters.ca.  In the comment below, we look beyond the short term insurance risk data needs and toward to holistic approach risk management.

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The journey toward a Canada-wide flood risk model shows one thing - a paradigm shift is needed in how the insurance industry, regulatory agencies and municipalities share data on flood risks. Only then will there be data to support fair and accurate insurance products based on risk, data that society can access and use to make important risk management decisions, and data that municipalities/regulatory agencies/ministries can use to set risk avoidance, reduction and remediation policies. The discussion today is just the first step toward that. While a robust 10 m fine grid flood risk screening tool could satisfy the immediate need for price local insurance products and assess portfolio risk, the long term goal has to be a comprehensive risk management strategy built on this type of data. How? Well if "flood is the new fire", consider the fire model where fire underwriters, municipal fire services their consultants, and property owners participate in a system that quantifies and shares risk data and where risk management decisions are made in a coordinated manner. 

With immediate product needs, the insurance industry requires a consistent risk model across the country and so has to resort to coarse 30 m topography cell screening to at best identify riverine risks - but can not account for the local factors such as hydraulic relief structures that are important for the higher frequency events (i.e., bridges, culverts and embankment underpasses that are 'under' the 30 m topography model), or the underworkings of sewer infrastructure or surface constraints (building flow obstructions) critical in urban flash flooding beyond river valley systems. Meanwhile, some municipalities are sitting on InfoWorks and EPA SWMM dual-drainage models that predict hydraulic flood levels pipe-by-pipe that characterizes basement flood risk, and predict block by block overland ponding for all storm return periods. Similarly, conservation authorities in Ontario have return period riverine flood levels derived from survey-grade topography and hydraulic structure surveys, considering calibrated flow hydrology. Flood risk data is not new - Toronto East York SWMM models were first developed in the 1970's on punch cards, Toronto North York models in the 1980's on 20MHz 386's - no need for GPU processing really. Today Toronto is covered in InfoWorks models, Hamilton has Mike Urban, Calgary XPSWMM ... and on.

But all this existing data is in silos, each with a single regulatory or management purpose, and never rolled-up, parsed, or aggregated to provide a baseline for insurance risk purposes. You can understand why Carpenter pursues a Canada-wide 30 m grid model for surface flooding or IBC develops MRAT for sanitary back-up risk characterization - its because it is easier to start from scratch with coarse risk assessment than to get down in the weeds of pipe-by-pipe municipal infrastructure flood models (that do vary by neighbourhood to neighbourhood, consultant by consultant, model platform by model platform), or creek-by-creek conservation authority (or other provincial agency) floodplain models (that do vary as well in terms of vintage, accuracy, consistency in hyetographs/design storm drivers).  So there has been a deluge of data building for a half century on riverine flood risk, and over decades on urban flood risks - but it has never been approached in a way that it can be leveraged for holistic flood risk management.

Under a new paradigm, with a more holistic risk management end goal in mind, flood risk data can be collected, developed and applied through a partnership approach, without the need to reinvent or duplicate riverine flood risk mapping. Consistent, shared risk data would support alignment between the regulatory aspects of flood risk management, the business decisions related to development, and municipal and government decisions on infrastructure investment and risk reduction programs (flood proofing, emergency preparedness, education).  The constraints to getting to there is not GPU computing power for 1 metre-cell 2D urban dual drainage models, but rather it is more fundamental and more challenging, relating to how various private and public organizations cooperatively manage issues of common interest.